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Abstract 
 
 
This paper delves into one of the most controversial debates in the political economy of 
Nigeria: the way revenue is shared amongst the component tiers of government in the 
country. It shows how the discovery of oil and the enormous revenues derived from it led 
to the de-emphasis of derivation as the basis for revenue allocation. This paper calls for a 
rethink of the current policy and  reversion to a derivation based revenue allocation 
system. Apart from helping douse the current tensions and feelings of injustice, which is 
currently widespread in the oil producing states, it will also help engender non oil 
producing states to develop other human and natural resources which they have long 
abandoned in the struggle for their share of the oil money. There is thus the need to give 
more powers for revenue creation and control back to the states. Such states will therefore 
be in a position to take into consideration their peculiar circumstances before determining 
their tax and revenue laws.  
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Introduction 
 
One of the most protracted and controversial debates in the Nigerian economy is the way 
Government revenue is shared amongst the component tiers of Government in the 
country.1 This debate has its foundations in the history and evolution of the Nigerian 
Federation. 2 The amalgamation story of what constitutes present day Nigeria started in 
1861 when the territory of Lagos was formally ceded to the British Government and it 
became the Lagos Colony. In 1885, the British Government proclaimed the Oil Rivers 
protectorate over some parts of present day Southern Nigeria. In 1896, the Royal Niger 
Company, which constituted some British companies operating in the Niger, obtained a 
royal charter, which gave it powers to “administer, make treaties, levy custom duties and 
trade in all territories in the basin of the Niger and its affluents.”3  This brought the 
northern territories of Nigeria under the influence of British traders. In 1906, Southern 
Nigeria and the Lagos colony were merged to become one administrative entity. Northern 
Nigeria and Southern Nigeria were subsequently merged, in 1914, to form what 
constitutes the present day Nigeria. In 1939, Southern Nigeria was divided into two with 
the Niger as the dividing line. This split the country into three components: the East 
where the Ibos dominated, the West where the Yorubas dominated and the North where 
                                                
1 “Revenue allocation or the statutory distribution of revenue from the Federation Account among the 
different levels of government has been one of the most contentious and controversial issues in the nation’s 
political life. So contentious has the matter been that none of the formulae evolved at various times by a 
commission or by decree under different regimes since 1964 has gained general acceptability among the 
component units of the country. Indeed, the issue, like a recurring decimal, has painfully remained the first 
problem that nearly every incoming regime has had to grapple with since independence. In the process, as 
many as thirteen different attempts have been made at devising an acceptable revenue allocation formula, 
each of which is more remembered for the controversies it generated than issues settled (Report of the 
Political Bureau, 1987, p.169). See also Obinna (1985, p.109), Danjuma (1994, p.45), Mbanefoh and 
Anyanwu (1990, p.199), Ndongko (1981, p.151) and Ola and Adeyemo (1998, p.25). 
 
2 “Federalism is essentially about government structure in the multilevel sense, rather than within a 
particular level of government, in the performance of government functions…  Fiscal federalism is 
essentially about the allocation of government spending and resources to the various tiers of government” 
(Taiwo, 1999, p. 4). See also, Teriba (1966, p. 361), Mbanefoh (1989, p.190) and Jinadu (1979, p.15; 1985, 
p.73). 
 
3 Ekundare (1973, p.12). 
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the Hausas /Fulanis dominated.  This regional division subsequently became the basis for 
administration and political tensions in the country. 
 
The struggle for the control of the nation’s resources have also, to some extent been 
based on the above regional division. This, entwined with political conflict, has 
sometimes led to political manipulations and delineations with the aim of influencing 
wealth allocation.  This has been especially so since revenue from oil gained prominence 
as the major source of revenue in the country. Along these lines, it has been suggested 
that: 
 
The setting up of three commissions on revenue allocation within a short 
period of twelve years is a manifestation of the instability that cha racterized 
the Nigerian polity. Between 1968 and 1980, income from petroleum 
constituted over 80 percent of federal revenue. The importance of the federal 
center therefore increased proportionately. As a consequence of this major 
shift in revenue generatio n, a desperate struggle to win control of state power 
ensued since this control meant for all practical purposes, being all powerful 
and owning everything. 4  
 
The most recent development in the struggle for the control of oil resources in Nigeria is 
the recent Supreme Court action instituted by the Federal Government against the oil 
producing states with respect to the offshore/ onshore oil dichotomy. 5 The April 2002 
decision of the Supreme Court to exclude the revenue derived from offshore drilling in 
the calculation of the revenue attributable to the oil producing states based on the 
derivation principle, has failed to resolve the controversy.  
                                                
 
4 Adesina, 1998, p.235. 
 
5 “There arose a dispute between the Federal Government on the one hand and the eight littoral States of 
Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers States on the other hand as to the 
Southern (or seaward) boundary of each of these States. The Federal Government contends that the 
southern (or seaward) boundary of each of these States is the low water mark of the land surface of such 
State… [or] the seaward limit of inland waters within the State, as the State so requires. The Federal 
Government, therefore, maintains that natural resources located within the Continental Shelf of Nigeria are 
not derivable from any State of the Federation. The eight littoral States do not agree with the Federal 
Governments’ contentions. Each claim that its territory extend beyond the low-water mark onto the 
territorial water and even unto the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. They maintain that 
natural resources derived from both onshore and offshore are derivable from their respective territory and 
in respect thereof each is entitled to the “not less than 13 percent” allocation as provided in the proviso to 
subsection (2) of section 162 of the Constitution” (Judgment by the Supreme Court, 5 April 2002).     
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This persistent struggle for revenue has however wide-ranging effect on the entire 
Nigerian economy. This paper argues that the focus on revenue sharing, as opposed to 
revenue generation, is the primary cause of economic, social and political decay in the 
country. It has, for instance, led to the proliferation of unviable local and state 
governments, neglect of other productive sectors of the economy and widespread 
corruption. This paper therefore calls for a rethink of the current revenue allocation 
formulae. Specifically, it advocates for the reversion to a system based mainly on 
derivation. Apart from helping douse the current tensions and feelings of injustice, which 
is currently widespread in the oil producing states, it will also help engender non oil 
producing states to develop other human and natural resources which they have long 
abandoned in the struggle for their share of the oil money. To achieve its aim, this paper 
is divided into four parts. Part One traces the origins of revenue allocation in Nigeria 
while Part Two examines the impact of the discovery of oil and oil revenue on the 
revenue allocation arrangements in the country. Part Three, shows the various ways the 
struggle for oil revenue has distorted our social and economic development while Part 
Four concludes the paper. 
 
The Evolution of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria 
 
The controversy over revenue allocation dates back to the origins of Nigeria. One of the 
main reasons for the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 by the 
Colonial Government was in order to enable the Colonial Government reduce its subsidy 
of the Colony of Northern Nigeria by using up the surpluses from Southern Nigeria. 
When in 1906, Southern Nigeria and Lagos became one administrative entity, the 
financial resources of the south increased rapidly. This however was not the case with 
Northern Nigeria. The region, with its meager resources mainly from direct taxation, 
found it difficult to balance its budget. It therefore relied heavily on grants from the 
Imperial Government to function. 6 Amalgamation therefore became a ploy by the 
                                                
6 “Throughout the whole of this period [1901-1914] Northern Nigeria was dependent on outside assistance 
in order to balance its budgets. Each year it received a large grant from the Imperial Government; without 
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Colonial Government to reduce the dependence of Northern Nigeria on British taxpayers. 
Along these lines, it has been argued that: 
 
The decision… to create a unified Nigeria on 1 January 1914 did not result 
from the pressure of local political groups; it derived from considerations of 
administrative convenience as interpreted by a colonial power. Lugard 
considered it unnecessary to carve up a territory undivided by natural 
boundaries, more so since one portion (the South) was wealthy enough to 
commit resources to even “unimportant” programmes while the other portion 
(the North), could not balance its budget necessitating the British taxpayer 
being called upon to bear the larger share of even the cost of its 
administration. This partly explains the amalgamation, an act which provoked 
bitter controversy at the time, arousing the resentment of educated elites and 
of some British administrators. It, nevertheless, saddled the country with an 
issue- the relationship between North and South- that has dominated its 
politics to this day. 7    
 
With amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, the colonial authorities 
established a legislative council for the colony of Lagos only. The legislative powers for 
the Protectorate of Northern and Southern Nigeria was vested in the Governor General of 
Nigeria. In 1923, an enlarged and partly elected legislative council was established for 
the Lagos Colony and the Southern Provinces of the Protectorate. The Council however 
did not have powers over the Northern parts of the Protectorate and the legislative powers 
for that part of the protectorate was vested in the Governor General.  Nigeria essentially 
became a unitary state. The reason for and implications of this arrangement has been 
explained thus: 
 
It may be taken for granted that this position was not the result of any desire 
to exclude the north; it was rather a reflection of the fact that the North 
showed no desire at the time to join with the South in the working of 
institutions uncongenial to their mode of thought and general outlook. … Had 
the Northern Provinces  joined earlier in the framing of national legislation 
and in particular in the consideration and passing of the annual budgets, it is 
probable that more of the available public revenues would have flowed 
Northwards than was in fact the case. The leaders, official and unofficial, of 
                                                                                                                                            
these grants it would not have been able to pay its way. It also received contributions from Southern 
Nigeria, but these were contributions in lieu of customs revenue, not grants or gifts of any kind. This 
apportionment of customs revenue was the only link between the Budgets of the South and of the North” 
(Hicks-Phillipson Report, 1951, p.68).    
 
7 Osadolor (1998, p.35). See also Nwokedi (2001, p.20) and Report of the Political Bureau (1987, p.169).   
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the North were, however, during the inter-war period… content to stand in 
comparative isolation and to concentrate their main energies on building up 
their strong system of Native Administration supported by the Native 
Administration share of the relatively high Northern rate of Direct Tax. 8   
 
It was based on the diversities of the various sections of the protectorate that the colonial 
authorities, after World War 2, decided to move the country from a unitary state towards 
a federal state. The Richards Constitution of 1946, despite its criticisms, marked the 
beginning of this shift. Essentially, it recognized the three regions that already existed in 
Nigeria since 1939: North, East and West. Each of the Regions had a legislative council 
(House of Assembly) dominated by British officials.9 The role of these Councils were 
purely advisory. The 1946 Constitution also established, for the first time, an all Nigeria 
Legislative Council which was inclusive of representatives from the Northern provinces. 
Like its regional counterparts, its role was purely advisory and it had no powers over 
budget.10  
 
The above developments raised the controversial question of how revenue was to be 
shared between the federal government, regional governments and the native authorities. 
This led the colonial authorities to appoint Sir Sydney Phillipson, the then Financial 
Secretary of the Nigerian Colony, to investigate the problems of the distribution of 
financial and administrative powers between the various  tiers of government.11 In his 
Report, Phillipson was of the opinion that the devolution of powers from the center to the 
regions was desirable. Essentially, he argued that: 
 
The natural and… desirable development of the new constitution will be 
towards progressive devolution, and the time may well come when the 
Regions will exercise, within their areas, powers akin to those normally 
exercised by Colonial Governments, the general government retaining direct 
authority in practice only over services not transferred to the Regions.12    
                                                
 
8 Hicks-Phillipson Report, 1951, p.12.  
 
9 The Northern Region had an additional House of Chiefs.   
 
10 Adebayo, 1993, p.22.  
 
11 Phillips, 1971, p.393. 
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Based on the above, the Phillipson Report argued that the apportionment of revenues to 
the various arms of government should be correlated with the apportionment of duties to 
the various arms of government. It therefore recommended the gradual evolution to a 
revenue sharing system mainly based on the derivation principle. It envisaged a situation 
where each regional government would be credited with the full amount of the tax 
collected under the Direct Taxation Ordinance of 1940 (as amended). All regions would 
also receive grants from the other non direct tax revenues of Nigeria and from other 
public funds of Nigeria in strict proportion to the contribution that the region makes to 
those other revenues.13 The report then went on to prescribe the horizontal table for the 
distribution of the said revenues amongst the various regions as follows: Northern 
Region: 46 percent; Western Region: 30 percent and; Eastern Region: 24 percent. This 
was based on the estimated relative contribution of the various regions to the Nigerian 
revenues not declared regional. 14   
 
The Phillipson Report can therefore rightly be described as the foundation of the 
derivation principle as the basis for revenue sharing among the various tiers of 
Government in Nige ria. The derivation principle has also become one of the most 
controversial features of revenue allocation in Nigeria.  At the time, for instance, the 
Northern region especially argued that it was difficult to determine the origins of goods 
especially for the purposes of determining which regions should pay for the customs duty 
                                                                                                                                            
12 Quoted in Adebayo, 1993, p.35.     
 
13 The preference of Phillipson for the derivation principle was based on his belief that there was need to 
inculcate in each region, a sense of “financial responsibility” so that they will all learn to “cut their coat 
according to their cloth” (Dina Committee Report, 1969, p.7).   
 
14 The unreliability of the data, from which the above figures were arrived at, became a rallying point for 
critics of the Phillipson Report and indeed all subsequent revenue allocation reports. It has, for instance, 
been noted that: “Each Commission has been plagued with statistical problems . From Phillipson (1946) to 
Aboyade (1977), problems of measurement have seemed insuperable and have wrought havoc to each 
successive effort at devising a workable formula for allocation. In some cases, for example, Phillipson, they 
led to the abandonment of particular principles; in other, for example, Aboyade, they led to the 
abandonment of the recommendations. Data on regional consumption of imports became the center of 
controversy in the 1950’s while data on population took on an additional explosive political significance in 
the 1960’s. Only the data on rents and royalties and export duties were politically neutral: but the allocation 
of revenue even from these sources created political controversy”  (Okigbo Committee Report, Volume 1, 
1978, pp. 15-16).  
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of imported goods. The same argument could also be extended to the revenues derived 
from the export of goods and services.15  
 
This was so because of the importance and materiality of trade related revenues in the 
entire budget of Nigeria. Between 1946 and 1950, for instance, customs duties alone 
contributed over 50 percent of the total revenue of the Nigerian Government. It was 
therefore at the time rightly stated that:  
 
It is a truism of Nigerian finance that the revenues of Nigeria are excessively 
dependent on external trade… By far the greater part of Customs and Excise 
is derived from Import Duties and the major part of Direct Taxes come from 
income Tax on Companies which tax is paid mainly by important Companies 
either registered in the United Kingdom or operating under directions from 
the United Kingdom and dealing in both imports and exports throughout 
Nigeria. … Nigeria is not of course unique in being dependent for a large part 
of its revenue on its trade with the outside world, but the fact that its 
dependence in this respect is so extreme not only makes the problem of 
revenue division in Nigeria one of special difficulty (since the transfer of 
revenues derived from tariffs, progressive Income Tax and Companies Tax to 
regional control is open to great practical and constitutional objections) but 
also point to the need (a) for the development of such new internal sources of 
revenue as may be possible and (b) for some stabilizing safeguard against 
those extreme fluctuations in overseas produce prices which made the inter-
War history of Nigeria a succession of brief periods of relative prosperity 
followed by longer periods of acute depression and slow and partial 
recovery. 16        
 
These structural imbalances which has subsequently reared its head in various forms, as 
will be seen later, continues, till date, to be a major characteristic of the Nigerian 
economy. It has also continued to influence the debate on revenue allocation in the 
country.  
 
                                                
15 It has for instance been argued that the “effect of the derivation arrangement was to intensify 
interregional controversy about the real volume of interregional trade. It led to the demand….that the free 
movement of trade and commerce between one region and the other be controlled so as to prevent customs 
duties on goods consumed in one region being attributed to the revenue of the other where the original 
importers or producers were based” (Quoted in Oyediran and Olagunju, 1979, p.194). 
 
16 Hicks Phillipson Report, 1951, pp. 26-27. 
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In 1947, a year after the adoption of the Phillipson Report, Sir John Macpherson replaced 
Arthur Richards as Governor of Nigeria. He soon initiated constitutional reforms which 
culminated in the Macpherson Constitution of 1951. This process, in turn culminated in 
the need to review the revenue sharing formulae of the colony. 17 This led to the 
appointment of a committee consisting of Dr. John Hicks, Mr. D A Skelton and Sir 
Sydney Phillipson to undertake the above review. 18  Their Report criticized the extensive 
reliance on the derivation principle adopted by the Phillipson Report. According to the 
Report: 
 
The application of the single principle of derivation to the division of the 
entire non-declared revenues represented an over-emphasis of the principle of 
regional self-dependence and tended to obscure the equally valid and perhaps 
more important principle of the needs of the people viewed as citizens of a 
united Nigeria.…[T]he unlimited application of the principle of derivation 
would be more appropriate in a loose confederation of almost independent 
states than in a federal constitution of the kind which Nigeria is about to 
achieve. It is not only, however, the principle of national unity, of the whole 
being greater than the part in more than a physical sense and of the well being 
of one part being dependent to a real extent on the well-being of other parts, 
that was obscured; the actual fact of mutual dependence tended to be 
forgotten. To measure what one Region owes to the efforts of its people, past 
and present, and what it owes to the efforts, past and present, of the peoples 
of other Regions, is an impossible task, but it is clear that the second debt 
exists, a fact which derivation as the sole principle of revenue division in 
some measures hides.19   
 
                                                
 
17 “Dissatisfaction with the Phillipson Scheme and the changes envisaged by the Macpherson Constitution 
of 1951, which introduced a quasi-federal system of government, led to the appointment of Professor John 
Hicks and Sir Sy dney Phillipson to develop a new system of revenue sharing for Nigeria.” (Ashwe, 1986, 
p.28). Please note that Mr. D A Skelton drowned shortly after arriving Lagos. He therefore did not partake 
fully in this work.  
 
18 According to their terms of reference:  “[1]. An expert and independent enquiry should be undertaken in 
consultation with all concerned, to submit proposals to the Governor-in-Council for division of revenue 
over a period of five years between the three Regions and the central Nigerian services, in order to achieve 
in that time a progressively more equitable division of revenue as between the three separate Regions and 
the Centre…. [2]. If investigation by the expert commission proves that one Region has been unfairly 
treated during past years, the Region should be allowed a block grant to make up for part of what it has 
lost” (Hicks-Phillipson Report, 1951, p.5).     
  
19  Hicks-Phillipson Report (1951, p.22). 
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Despite this, the Hicks-Phillipson Report did not altogether jettison the derivation 
principle. Rather, it retained it for the allocation of such taxes as could be allocated with 
simplicity and certainty to the regions. An example was taxes on tobacco. Here, for 
instance, it was recommended that 50 percent of the revenue from it was to be allocated 
to the regions on the basis of derivation. Non regional revenues, which constituted the 
majority of the Nigerian budget was however to be shared based on the principle of 
‘need’ and ‘national interest.’20 Based on its second terms of reference, the Committee 
also recommended the payment of a one off grant of two million Pounds to the Northern 
Region. This was to make up for what it considered to be its relative deprivation in the 
past years.21 Essentially, the Hicks-Phillipson Report materially altered the derivation 
focus of the 1948 Phillipson Report. This new arrangement was received with mixed 
feelings. The West, for instance, which was rich, thanks to  the cocoa boom clamored for 
a reversion to the regime mainly based on derivation, the East took an opposite stand.22  
 
By 1953, two years after the Hicks-Phillipson Report, there arose the need to again 
review the revenue allocation system of Nigeria. This was as a consequence of the 
Constitutional developments of the time. Events at the time sensitized the Colonial 
Government to the need to change the Constitutional arrangement from that of 
‘democratic centralism’ to ‘federalism.’23 This culminated in the replacement of the 
                                                
 
20 “The principles, which are appropriate for the distribution of revenue in a unitary state are therefore two. 
On the one hand, it is quite proper for the Central Government to make grants in such a way as to 
encourage expenditure of national importance [like education], though this principle should not be carried 
so far as to open the gates to excessively unequal treatment. On the other hand, the money should be 
distributed in such a way as to be fair among individuals. The simplest application of this second principle 
is to make grants to local authorities in proportion to the size of the populations for which they are 
responsible; and whatever qualifications may be introduced into this rule, it does look as if population 
ought to be the basis of allocation from this point of view” (Hicks-Phillipson, 1951, p.55). Because of the 
unreliable population records at the time, the Report used the number of male adult taxpayers in the regions 
as a basis for the above allocations (Ashwe, 1986, p.29).    
 
21 Hicks Phillipson Report (1951, p.84). 
 
22  Phillips (1971, p.395). 
 
23 “After only two years of o perating under the system of revenue sharing recommended by the Hicks-
Phillipson Commission, it was realized that ‘democratic centralism’ or ‘quasi federalism’ must give way to 
federalism in the country’s constitutional arrangements if the various parts of Nigeria were to remain 
together. The breakdown of the Hicks-Phillipson arrangements was due mainly to the limited federal 
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Macpherson Constitution with the Littleton Constitution (named after Sir Oliver Littleton 
who was then the British Colonial Secretary responsible for the Colonies). The revised 
Constitution provided the Regions greater autonomy to make laws for themselves on 
residual matters not specifically included in the exclusive legislative list. The Regions 
were also granted the powers to legislate, again for itself, on matters contained in the 
concurrent legislative lists, which it shared with the Federal Government.24 It was 
however made explicit that in the event of conflict, the Federal legislation was to be 
considered superior.  
 
The move towards federalism had become imperative with the developments in 1953. 
That was when Anthony Enahoro, a Southerner, moved a motion on the floor of the 
House of Representatives calling for the independence of Nigeria by 1956. The Northern 
members of the House opposed this. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto 
explained the position of the North in the floor of the House as follows: 
 
The North does not intend to accept the invitation to commit suicide…. As 
representatives of the people, we from the North feel that in all major issues 
such as this one, we are duty bound to consult those we represent… If the 
Honorable members from the West and the East speak to this motion un-
amended, for their people I must say here and now, Sir, that we from the 
North have been given no such mandate by our people…. We were late in 
assimilating western education yet within a short time we will catch up with 
[other] Regions, and share their lot…. We want to be realistic and consolidate 
our gains. It is our resolute intention to build our development on sound and 
lasting foundations so that they would be lasting.25  
 
At the time the above changes were being proposed to the Macpherson Constitution, it 
was realized that the changes would also impact on revenue allocation in the Nigerian 
Colony. There was therefore need to also review the financial relationships between the 
                                                                                                                                            
structure of the Macpherson Constitution rather than to the failure of the scheme itself. The size and 
diversity of Nigeria coupled with the intense regional loyalty and rivalry of the people rendered the 1951 
Constitution unworkable” (Ashwe, 1986, p.30). 
 
24 Nwokedi (2001, p.22). 
 
25 Quoted in Albert (1998, p.54). Partly because of such views and differences, the Eastern and Western 
Regions achieved self-rule in 1956 while the Northern Regions got its own in 1959.  
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regions and the federal government and amongst themselves. This led to the appointment 
of Sir Louis Chick Commission of Inquiry. The Commission’s terms of reference, which 
stressed the importance of derivation as the basis for revenue sharing, reflected the 
Colonial thinking of moving towards federalism at the time. The Commission was 
explicitly mandated to: 
 
…enquire how the revenues available, or to be made available, to the 
Regions and to the Centre can best be collected and distributed, having regard 
on the one hand to the need to provide to the Regions and to the Centre an 
adequate measure of fiscal autonomy within their own sphere government 
and, on the other hand, to the importance of ensuring that the total revenues 
available to Nigeria are allocated in such a way that the principle of 
derivation is followed to the fullest degree compatible with meeting the 
reasonable needs of the Centre and each of the Regions.26 
 
From the above terms of reference it is clear that the colonial authorities chose not to give 
the Chick Commission much room for maneuver. Given the differences especially 
between the North and the other regions, it believed that there was need for the 
establishment of true federalism that would give each region room to develop at its own 
pace. Granting the regions greater fiscal autonomy was therefore necessary if the above 
objectives were to be achieved.       
 
 Based on the above, it was therefore not surprising that the Chick Commission 
recommended that less emphasis be placed on ‘need’ and ‘national interest’ as determinants 
of revenue allocation in the colony. The Report also showed strong preference for fiscal 
autonomy and materially increased the weight allocated to derivation as a basis for revenue 
sharing. In detail, the Report recommended that: the federal government should keep 50% 
of the general import duty while 50% should go to the regions on derivation basis; the 
federal government should keep 50% of the import and excise duty on tobacco, the rest 
going to the regions based on derivation; 100% of the import duty on motor spirit should go 
to the regions; 100% of the mining rent and royalty should go to the regions, and; both 
levels should share the export duty on hides and skins on a 50-50 basis. The Report however 
enjoined the Federal Government to maintain a discretionary power to make grants to needy 
                                                
26 Chick Report (1953, p.1). 
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regions in serious difficulties.27 The above revenue allocation formulae, was however 
fundamentally altered in 1958 when a new revenue allocation commission was set up. This 
also coincided with the discovery of oil in Nigeria.  
 
Oil and Revenue Allocation in Nigeria 
 
The discovery of oil in some parts of Eastern Nigeria and the potential it had for growth 
altered the thinking about the place of minerals in the revenue allocation formulae. As 
already mentioned, up till then, royalties from minerals fully belonged to the region of 
origin. In 1958, however, the discovery of oil in Nigeria coincided with the need to 
review the existing revenue allocation scheme, which was a fallout of the 1957/58 
Constitutional Conference and the imminence of political independence. The Colonial 
Government subsequently appointed Sir Jeremy Raisman and Professor Ronald Tress to 
review the federal fiscal structure.28 The Committee, in the main, recommended that the 
regions should have authority over produce sales tax and sales tax on motor vehicle fuel. 
It also recommended the establishment of a Distributable Pools Account (DPA) for the 
purposes of sharing federally collectible revenues.  
 
Perhaps the most significant proposal of the Commission was the recommendation that 
the then practice of returning mining rents and royalties to the regions should be 
discontinued. Such revenues was now to be shared through the DPA with the region of 
origins getting 50 percent, Federa l Government, 20 percent and  all the other regions, 30 
                                                
 
27 Chick Report (1953, pp.25-27). See also Ewa (1976, p. 70). 
 
28 Among others, the Committee was mandated to: “examine the present division of powe rs to levy taxation 
in the Federation of Nigeria and the present system of allocation of the revenue thereby derived in the light 
of: (i) experience of the system to date; (ii) the allocation of functions between the Governments in the 
Federation…  (iii) the desirability of ensuring that the maximum possible proportion of the income of the 
Regional Governments should be within the exclusive power of those Governments to levy and collect, 
taking into account, considerations of national and inter Regional policy;…. (v) insofar as the independent 
revenues that can be secured for the various Governments are insufficient to provide not only for their 
immediate needs but also for a reasonable degree of expansion, and bearing in mind the Federal 
Government’s own further needs, the desirability of allocating further Federal revenue in accordance with 
such arrangements as will best serve the overall interests of the Federation as a whole” (Raisman Report, 
1958, p.1).       
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percent. Although oil was a new discovery in the colony, and the revenue from it at the 
time (1958/59) was estimated to be only 65,000 Pounds, it had great prospects. 
According to the Report: 
 
The allocation of the proceeds of mining royalties has presented us with a 
most perplexing problem. Although the revenues from columbite royalties 
rose rapidly at the time of the American stockpiling in 1953-55, royalties on 
tin, columbite and coal, normally yield a fairly constant annual sum. If these 
were the only minerals concerned, there might be no difficulty in our 
recommending the continuation of the present system… The problem is oil. 
Test production of oil has already started in the Eastern Region and 
exploration is being undertaken in both the North and the West. While the 
yield from oil royalties is at present comparatively small, … we cannot 
ignore the possibility that the figure may rise very markedly within the next 
few years…. There is therefore a double obstacle in our recommending the 
simple continuation of the existing method of allocating mineral royalties. 
First, it would involve us, in our revenue assessment for the next few years, 
in crediting the Eastern Region with a source of income which is at once too 
uncertain to build upon, and too sizeable to ignore. Secondly, it would rob 
our recommendations of any confident claim to stability for the future since 
oil development might take place in any one of the Regions on a scale, which 
would quite upset the balance of national development, which is part of our 
task to promote… Our considered conclusion therefore is that the time for 
change is now, while there is still uncertainty as to which of the Regions may 
be the lucky beneficiary or which may benefit the most.29 
 
Based on the above, the Raisman Report significantly reduced the use of derivation as a 
principle for sharing the DPA. In its place, it introduced four variables: continuity, 
minimum responsibility, population and balanced development of the federation. 30  
 
As stated above, oil was not the first natural resource to be exploited in Nigeria. Prior to 
its discovery, tin and bauxite were being exploited in the Northern region solely for the 
benefit of the North. 31 The West could not be bothered because it was the wealthiest of 
the three regions, thanks to the cocoa boom. 32 The East had very little natural or 
                                                
 
29 Raisman Report, 1958, p.24.  
 
30 Raisman Report, 1958, pp.31-32.  
 
31 Nwokedi, 2001, p.56. 
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agricultural resources. Although it was unhappy with the concept of derivation, it was 
forced to develop other sources of income in its bid to survive. In 1956, for instance, the 
then Finance Minister of the Eastern Region, Dr S E Imoke, proposed a Finance Bill to 
the Regional House of Assembly. One of the propositions of the bill was to replace the 
old income tax with a regional income tax based on the Pay as You Earn (PAYE) system. 
Essentially, the old tax system at the time was a direct tax based on a flat rate, and 
collected by the local authorities. On these, the Regional Government charged only a 
small capitation levy.  
 
The PAYE system however marked a major departure from the system that existed then. 
Under it, taxes were now levied and collected by the Regional Government. The local 
governments, which previously collected such revenues, now received grants from the 
Regional Government. The PAYE tax was however not the only new tax introduced by 
the Finance Bill. It has, for instance, rightly been pointed out that: 
 
Apart from the PAYE Tax, the Finance Bill also introduced an entertainment 
tax. The rate of this tax varied from 1 penny per ticket costing less than 7 
pence to 1 shilling per ticket costing more than 5 shillings…. Other taxes 
contained in the Finance Bill included the purchase tax on petrol (6 pence per 
gallon), beer and stout (3 pence per normal bottle), whisky (1 shilling per 
normal bottle), and other spirits (9 pence per normal bottle), In addition, a 
purchase tax was imposed on produce bought in the Region at the rate of … 4 
[Pounds] per ton (palm oil or cocoa), … 2 [Pounds] per ton (palm kernel), 
and 10 shillings per ton (benniseed)… A tax was also imposed on cattle 
entering the Region. The rate was fixed at 10 shillings per head. To increase 
its revenue further, the Region approached the Federal Government and 
requested that it be paid a royalty on coal mined in the region and used by the 
Nigerian Railway Corporation. With effect from 1956, a royalty of 10 
shillings per ton was paid to the regional Government on coal… Thus while 
the Western Regional Government was more concerned with how to spend its 
revenue, the main concern of the Eastern Regional Government was how to 
raise the revenue for its minimum needs.33    
 
                                                                                                                                            
32 According to Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a one time Premier of the Western Region: “It is dishonest to the 
extreme for a relatively poorer state to expect to have a share from the revenue derived from a relatively 
richer state” (quoted in Obinna, 1985, p.113).   
 
33 Adebayo, 1993, p.84).  
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Despite its revenue from tin and bauxite, the Northern Region also was still concerned 
with the generation of additional revenues to help it meet its minimum needs. In 1954, for 
instance, the Regional Executive Council, at the recommendation of the Financial 
Secretary approved the following measures in order to help boost the finances of the 
Region: increase in the toll of trade cattle moving both by foot and rail; the introduction 
of a tax on kola nut; increase in the rates for the licensing of cars and lorries; the 
imposition of bicycle licensing; the doubling of licensing fees for arms; and the re-
imposition of produce sales tax. 34  
 
From the above, it is clear that at the time that the derivation principle reigned supreme in 
the distribution of revenue in Nigeria, the less endowed regions tended to be more 
innovative in their bid to improve their finances. Essentially, each of these regions tried 
to take advantage of its own endowments and peculiar circumstances in their quest to 
generate additional revenues. All these however changed with the discovery of oil in 
Eastern Nigeria. The de-emphasis of derivation as a basis for sharing revenue and the 
adoption of factors like even development led the Raisman Commission to recommend 
the unification of some aspects of the Nigerian tax system. 35 The implication of this was 
that the flexibility of regions with respect to adapting to their unique circumstances for 
generating revenues was greatly reduced. This marked a fundamental shift of focus from 
revenue generation to revenue allocation. As will be seen later, most regions 
subsequently used various overt and convert ways in their attempt to increase the 
revenues derived from the DP A. 
 
In 1964, in accordance with Section 164 of the new Republican Constitution of 1963, the 
Federal Government appointed Mr. K J Binns as Fiscal Commissioner with the mandate 
to review the appropriateness of: the existing formulae for the allocation of the proceeds 
of mining rents and royalties; the proportion of the proceeds of duties payable in respect 
of import into Nigeria of any commodity other than motor spirit, diesel oil, tobacco, 
                                                
 
34 Adebayo, 1993, pp. 86-87. 
 
35 Raisman Report, 1958, pp. 21-22. 
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wine, portable spirits or beer payable to the DPA; and, the existing formulae for the 
distribution of funds in the DPA.36 The Binns Commission, in general, did not 
recommend any fundamental changes in the existing revenue sharing formulae of the 
country. One of the main recommendations of the Report was that when excise duty is 
imposed on locally produced motor spirit and diesel oil, the federation shall pay to the 
regions, proceeds of the duty based on the consumption in the various regions.37   
 
The above report formed the basis of the revenue allocation practice in Nigeria until the 
Military Coup of January 1966 brought General Aguiyi Ironsi, to power. Perhaps because 
of the command structure of the military, the new government quickly moved to 
consolidate its hold on the entire country. In May 1966, via Decree Number 34, the new 
ruler abolished the federal structure of government and the regions thereby converting 
Nigeria into a unitary state. This however proved to be a costly mistake for him as he was 
overthrown and killed in July 1966. The new Leader, Lieutenant Colonel (later General) 
Gowon, immediately restored the regions and abolished the unitary system. 38  
 
Political tensions arising from the coup and counter coup, both of 1966, led Lieutenant 
Colonel Ojukwu, the Governor of the Eastern Region, which was custodian to majority of 
Nigerian oil reserves, to threaten secession. Partly because of the revenue implications of 
such a secession for the entire federation, the federal government was unwilling to allow 
it. As tension rose, the Federal Government moved to reduce the  powers of the regions by 
creating twelve states out of the existing four regions. 39 Of these twelve states, the 
Eastern Region had three. Essentially, the Government skillfully carved out two states 
(Rivers State and South Eastern State) from the main oil producing areas, which 
incidentally belonged to the minority tribes in the former Eastern Region. The third State, 
dominated by the Ibos, instantly became an impoverished, landlocked State. It was 
therefore not surprising that it was on the same day that Gowon created the 12 states that 
                                                
36 Binns Commission Report, 1964, p.5.  
 
37 Binns Commission Report, pp.35-37. 
 
38 Ehwarieme, 1999, p.57. 
 
39 Mid Western Region was carved out of the Western Region in 1963. 
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Ojukwu proclaimed the entire Eastern Region as an independent Republic of Biafra.40 
This culminated in the 30 months Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).  
 
With the creation of new states, a revision of the revenue sharing arrangement became 
imminent. The Federal Government subsequently promulgated the Constitution 
(Financial Provisions) Decree Number 15 of 1967. Essentially, this Decree divided the 
share of the Northern Region from the DPA equally amongst the six states created from 
it. Those of the East and the West were shared among their emergent states on the basis 
of population. 41 This marked the origins of population into the revenue sharing formulae 
of Nigeria.42  
 
Criticisms of the modified Binns revenue allocation formulae, led to the appointment of 
another revenue allocation commission headed by Chief I O Dina, in 1968.43 Essentially, 
the Commission was asked to: examine and suggest changes to the existing system of 
revenue allocation in the country. Its mandate extended to all forms of revenue going to 
each Government besides and including the DPA. The Committee was also mandated to  
suggest new sources of revenue for both for the federal and state governments.44 The 
Committee, which based its recommendations on the need to maintain national unity, 
expanded both the role and revenue base of the Federal Government to the detriment of 
the State Governments. According to its Report: 
 
                                                
 
40 Uche, 2002, p. 33.  
 
41 See Section 1 of Decree number 15 of 1967. See also Osemwota (1983/84, p.12). 
 
42 Ashwe (1986, p.33) and Nyong (1998, pp.35-36).  
 
43 Some of the criticisms leveled against the 1967 Decree were: (i) that it contained arbitrary provisions 
being the result of hurried decisions taken in the exigency of creating new states under conditions of a 
national emergency; (ii) That it dealt only with the Distributable Pool Account and therefore failed: (a) to 
take cognizance of the additional administrative costs involved in the creation of states, (b) to realize that 
the status quo can no longer be assumed in deciding the revenue allocation arrangement, (c) to take account 
of the basic elements which formed the basis of the original allocation of revenue between the constituent 
units of the Federation. These were, population, financial need, derivation and even development (Dina, 
1969, p.17).   
 
44 Dina Committee Report, 1969, p.1. 
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The existence of a multiplicity of taxing and spending authorities with regard 
to the same revenue source or expenditure function not only generates major 
administrative problems, but also reduces the effectiveness of any fiscal co-
ordination effort. This weakness is particularly manifest under planning 
conditions which require a positive integration of development planning and 
fiscal administration. The logic of planning renders invalid the dichotomy 
between public finance and development finance, and demands that revenue 
allocation be seen as an integral part of the later. Once it is accepted that the 
overwhelming social urge is for accelerated economic development as a 
major prerequisite for expansion of welfare services, then the point must be 
sustained that financial relations become only meaningful in the context of 
integrated development planning. 45  
 
It was based on the above background that the Committee recommended, among others, 
that the DPA should be renamed States Joint Account (SJA) and that a Special Grants 
Account (SGA) be established. Funds here were to be administered by the Planning and 
Fiscal Commission, which was also to be established. Allocation of funds from this 
account should be based on the following principles: tax effort, balanced development 
and national interest. The Report, for the first time, also introduced the onshore/ offshore 
dichotomy in the sharing of oil revenue in Nigeria. All revenues accruing from offshore 
operations should be shared along the following lines: Federal Government, 60 percent; 
SJA, 30 percent; and SGA, 10 percent. Royalties from onshore operations was to be 
assigned on the following basis: Federal Government, 15 percent; State of derivation, 10 
percent; States Joint Account, 70 percent and SGA, 5 percent. Revenue from Excise Duty 
was to be allocated on the following basis: Federal Government, 60 percent; SJA, 30 
percent; and SGA, 10 percent while that from Import Duty was to be shared on the 
following basis: Federal Government, 50 percent and SJA, 50 percent. Finally, revenue 
from Export Duty was to be shared as follows: Federal Government, 15 percent; State of 
Derivation, 10 percent; SJA, 70 percent; and SGA, 5 percent.46    
                                                
 
45 Dina Committee Report, 1969, p.29. The Report further stated: “We believe that the fiscal arrangements 
in this country should reflect the new spirit of unity to which the nation is dedicated. No more evidence of 
this is necessary than the present war to preserve this unity at the cost of human lives, material resources 
and the radical change in this country’s structure. It is in the spirit of this new-found unity that we have 
viewed all the sources of revenue of this country as the common funds of the country to be used for 
executing the kind of programmes which can maintain this unity” (p.27).    
 
46 Dina Committee Report, 1969, pp.103 -107. 
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In line with its increased revenues, the Federal Government was also inundated with 
additional responsibilities. These, among others, included: taking full responsibility for 
the financing of higher education, prisons, public safety and scientific and industrial 
research. The Committee, like the Raisman Commission, also recommended the 
introduction of uniform tax legislation for the entire country. 47  
 
While the Report favored the Federal Government, it was vehemently opposed by most 
of the States. In fact, the Report was, in April 1969, rejected by the meeting of 
commissioners of finance of the federation. This was possible because of the peculiar 
circumstances of the time. It has, for instance, been argued that:  
 
In 1969 the commissioners of finance at the federation were mostly seasoned 
politicians led at the federal level by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who chaired 
the meeting at which the report was rejected in April 1969. In the early years 
of Gowon rule, the regime needed the politicians more than the politicians 
needed the regime. This was more true of the period of civil war when it was 
most difficult to release army officers to hold political offices. In other 
words, in 1969, unlike in the years after the civil war when civil 
commissioners were relegated to the corridors of power by super permanent 
secretaries, the politicians played a critical role in government decision 
making.  It should be added here that some of these civil commissioners 
expected a return to civil rule soon after the civil war and because of the 
opportunity of staying in the limelight during the period they expected to be 
in a stronger position to determine the nature and pattern of revenue 
allocation through a commission chosen by them.48   
 
Despite the above rejection, the Federal Government later implemented most of the 
recommendations of the Dina Committee Report. This was done with the promulgation 
of Decree Number 9 of 1971. Essentially, this transferred rents and royalties of offshore 
petroleum mines from the states to the federal government.49 This was tantamount to 
                                                
47 Dina Committee Report, 1969, pp.103 -107. 
 
48 Oyediran and Olagunju (1979, p.200).  
 
49 The oil producing states were most unhappy about this development. According to one of them: “This 
State Government is unable to appreciate the rationale behind this distinction drawn between oil mined 
from its mainland and the oil extracted from the adjoining continental shelf which is an integral part of the 
total economic resources which the people of this State have tapped from ancient times to sustain 
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adopting the recommendations of the Dina Report, which was rejected in 1969, through 
the back door.50 In 1975, the Government promulgated the Constitution (Financial 
Provisions etc) Decree Number 6. This decreed that all revenues shared by the states, 
with the exception of the 20 percent of onshore mining rents and royalties belonging to 
the states of origin, based on the derivation principle, should pass through the DPA. In 
other words, 80 percent of mining rents and royalties, 35 percent of import duties, 100 
percent of duties on motor spirits, tobacco and hides and skin and 50 percent of excise 
duties, all now had to pass through the DPA. The Decree further stipulated that the DPA 
be divided among the states on the following basis: fifty percent based on equality of 
states and the remaining fifty percent based on population. 51     
 
Shortly after the promulgation of the above decree, General Gowon was overthrown and 
replaced by Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed. The new Government, via 
Decree Number 12 of 1976 increased the number of states in the country from 12 to 19. 
Although the revenue sharing scheme was not affected, this development fur ther 
weakened the powers of the states relative to the federal government. Some of the states 
became increasingly dependent on grants from the federal government for such basic 
needs as administration. 52 
 
The new military administration also made explicit its intention to hand over power to 
civilians. It subsequently, appointed a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) to prepare 
a draft constitution that would aid the transition. A technical Committee on Revenue 
                                                                                                                                            
themselves. Until the arrival of oil industry, which imposed some restrictions on fishery in the Niger delta 
area, the continental shelf of this State offered ideal fishing grounds for the local inhabitants. To the 
consternation of many, Decree Number 9 of 1971 was passed and this repealed section 141 (b) of the 1963 
Constitution which provided that “the continental shelf of a Region shall be deemed to be part of that 
Region”. Thus a littoral State could no longer derive any benefit from the oil extracted from the continental 
shelf” (See Okigbo Commission Report, Volume 3, pp.117-8).   
 
50 According to the Official Biography of the then Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon: “The Dina 
Report was rejected by the states essentially because of its political assumptions…. Gowon did not raise 
dust over the issue, but quietly implemented most aspects of this report through the back door” (Eliagwu, 
1986, p.177). 
 
51 See sections 1-6.   
 
52 Ashwe, 1986, p.34.  
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allocation was then appointed, under the chairmanship of Professor Aboyade. Its 
propositions were to be submitted to the CDC and if adopted, made part of the new 
Constitution. In summary, the Committee recommended that all federally collectible 
revenues, without distinction, should be paid into the federation account. It also, for the 
first time, took into account, local governments in the vertical distribution of the 
federation account. It, for instance, recommended that the proceeds of the Federation 
Account should be shared between the federal government, state governments and local  
governments in the following proportions: 60 percent, 30 percent and ten percent 
respectively. From its share, the federal government was required to set aside 3 percent 
for the benefit of mineral producing areas and areas in need of rehabilitation from 
emergencies and disasters.53 On the horizontal allocation of revenue amongst the States, 
the Committee jettisoned the existing principles of revenue sharing arguing that: 
 
Population has been characterized by illogicality, inconsistency and inequity; 
derivation had done much to “poison intergovernmental relations and hamper 
a sense of national unity” ; need had “little if any operational relevance” ; 
even development was analytically ambiguous… (and was) not technically 
feasible to measure in any meaningful way”; equality of status of states was a 
“consolation prize to states not favored by the population and derivation 
principles”; geographical peculiarities defied any “concise definition… (and 
had) little or no merit”; natio nal interest was “capable of many interpretations 
(and) circumstances.”54.   
 
 It then recommended the adoption of five new principles. These were: Equality of 
Access to Development Opportunities, National Minimum Standards for National 
Integration, Absorptive Capacity, Independent Revenue and Tax Effort and Fiscal 
Efficiency. 55 The Aboyade Report was however extensively criticized. The economic 
background of its prescriptions was especially attacked. Sylvester Ugoh, a member of the 
Constituent Assembly, for instance, questioned the wisdom behind the Reports reliance 
                                                
 
53 Okigbo Committee Report, Volume 1, 1980, p.21. 
 
54 Quoted in Adesina, 1998, p.234.  
 
55 See Aliyu, (1977) and Daily Times (June 24, 1978, p.20) for a critique of these principles.   
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on the data based on the 1975-1980 National Development Plan. According to him, some 
sections of the report was based on the:  
 
Implicit assumption that the 1975-80 Plan would be fully or largely 
implemented. As such, the projects which are represented by these 
allocations would be realized. In such a situation, what the measure would 
show would be the socio -economic gaps that will arise from the full 
implementation of the Plan. But the fact is tha t our National Plans, and 
especially that of 1975-80, are usually expressions of pious hopes and wide 
expectations. In fact, the 1975-80 Plan has proved to be mostly a national 
dream. And if that is the situation, how can we use such dream- like 
allocations, which are unrealistic and unrealizable to measure socio-economic 
gaps in our development.56  
 
Another member of the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Pius Okigbo, criticized the vertical 
distribution of revenue amongst the various tiers of Government arguing that the 
Aboyade Report unduly favored the federal government.57 Based on such criticisms, the 
Constituent Assembly rejected the Aboyade Report. In 1979, the newly elected 
government of President Shehu Shagari appointed a new Committee headed by Dr. Pius 
Okigbo to review the “formulae for revenue allocation having regard to such factors as 
the national interest, derivation, population, even development, equitable distribution and 
the equality of states.”58  
 
On the sharing of revenue, among the various tiers of government (vertical allocation), 
the Okigbo Committee recommended the following formulae: Federal Government (53 
percent) state governments (30 percent), local governments (10 percent). 7 percent was to 
be set aside as special funds for the following purposes: development of the Federal 
Capital Territory, 2.5 percent; special problems of mineral producing areas, 2 percent; 
ecological problems, 1 percent; and Revenue equalization Fund, 1.5 percent.59 For the 
                                                
56 See Daily Time s, June 23, 1978.  
 
57 “I think that the shares of the joint account going to the federation can be reduced to much less than 60 
percent, without emasculating the Federal Government. I would have been quite happy with a share of 45 
percent for the federation and 55 percent for the states combined with 10 percent being reserved for the 
local government out of the 55 percent” (Quoted in New Nigeria, 6th June, 1978, p.9).  
 
58 Okigbo Report, 1980, Volume 1, p.5.  
 
59 Okigbo Report, 1980, Volume 1, p.86.  
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horizontal allocation of revenue among the states, the Report adopted four criteria. These 
were: minimum responsibilities of government (40 percent), population (40 percent), 
Social development factor/ primary school enrolment (15 percent) and internal revenue 
effort (5 percent).60  
 
The Government White Paper adopted the Okigbo recommendations only with slight 
modifications. 61 This culminated in the promulgation of the Revenue Allocation Act 
Number 1 of 1981. In summary, the Act provided that the federation account shall be 
shared amongst the various tiers of Government as follows: Federal Government, 58.5 
percent; State Governments, 31.5 percent; Local Governments, 10 percent. 26.5 percent 
of the state allocation shall be allocated to all states, while the remaining 5 percent shall 
be allocated on the basis of derivation. Two- fifths of the 5 percent of this derivation fund 
shall be paid out to the states in direct proportion to the value of minerals extracted from 
their areas while the remaining three- fifths shall be paid into a special fund to be 
administered by the federal government for the development of the mineral producing 
areas. The 26.5 percent outstanding to the credit of all states shall be distributed amongst 
them using the following criteria: equality of states (50 percent), population (40 percent) 
and land area (10 percent). Finally, the 58.5 percent allocated to the federal government 
shall be subdivided as follows: responsibilities and duties of the federal government (55 
percent), development of the Federal Capital Territory (2.5 percent) and ecological 
problems (1 percent).62  
 
This Act was however widely criticized mainly on the grounds that it allocated too much 
revenue to the Federal Government to the detriment of the states and local governments. 
The result was that the Federal Government could afford to waste valuable resources in 
                                                
 
60 Okigbo Report, 1980, Volume 1, p.101. 
 
61 On the vertical distribution of revenue amongst the various tiers of Government, for instance, the Federal 
Government modified the Okigbo recommendations as follows: Federal Government, 55 percent; State 
Government, 30 percent; Local Government, 8 percent; and Special Funds, 7 percent (Government Views 
on Okigbo Report, 1980, p.13).  
 
62 See Sections 1-4 of the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Accounts) Act of 1981. 
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the financing of unprofitable white elephant projects while the states and local 
governments were starved of funds. According to an Editorial by the Daily Sketch at the 
time:  
 
To expect an allocation which gives the Federal Government 55 % and the 19 
states only 30 percent to achieve the contrary will be like living in a world of 
fantasy. There is sufficient evidence to prove that the ugly phenomenon of 
growth without development arises from the spending of too much money on 
a few growth industries to the neglect of people-development oriented 
projects. … Yet do we have to build giant industries and make our people 
sub-human? Tens of millions of our people are wallowing in abject poverty. 
States and local governments whose pre-eminent job is to see to their welfare 
are helpless. They are starved of funds while the federal government soaked 
in billions of Naira, fritter away much needed money on fruitless and 
worthless grandiose projects. How human is it to give Abuja 2.5 % while 
even the most populous state cannot get 2 %? The average is less than 1.6 % 
for millions of people.63  
 
This 1981 Act was however, technically declared null and void by the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria. It was subsequently replaced with the Allocation of Revenue (Federation 
Account) Act Number 1 of 1982. Essentially, this increased the share of the states in the 
vertical revenue allocation from 31.5 to 35 percent. The FCT was however now classified 
as a state. Furthermore, the funding for the 1 percent ecological funds was also 
transferred from the federal government to the states. Finally, the fund for the 
development of mineral producing areas was reduced from 3 percent to 1.5 percent. 64 The 
net effect of this was that the federal government’s share of the federation account 
remained unaltered. On the horizontal sharing of revenue amongst the States, the Decree 
adopted the following criteria: minimum responsibility of government, 40 percent; 
population, 40 percent; social development factor, 15 percent; and internal revenue effort, 
5 percent.65  
 
                                                
 
63  Daily Sketch (November 11, 1980, p.2). See also Rimi (1980, p.2) for a similar criticism.   
 
64 See Sections 1-3 of the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Accounts) Act Number 1 of 1982.   
 
65 See Section 2 of the Allocation of Revenue Act 1982. 
 30 
Shortly after the promulgation of this Act, the military, in December 1983, overthrew the 
government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari and Major General Mohammadu Buhari became the 
new Head of State. His Government, subsequently, promulgated the Allocation of 
Revenue (Federation Account) Amendment Decree Number 36 of 1984. This, in the 
main, only altered the existing formulae for revenue allocation marginally. It reserved 55 
percent of the Federation Account exclusively for the federal government  and maintained 
the local governments’ share at 10 percent. The 1 percent and 1.5 percent for the 
development of mineral producing areas were also retained. The share of the state 
governments’ in the Federation Account was 32.5 percent. Out of this, 2 percent was to 
be paid directly to the mineral producing states in direct proportion to the value of 
minerals extracted from such states. Finally, the Decree retained the Shagari regime basis 
for the horizontal sharing of revenue amongst the states.66  
 
In 1989, the military government, then headed by General Ibrahim Babangida, appointed 
a permanent revenue allocation committee: National Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal 
Commission (NRMAFC). The Committee prescribed the following formulae for the 
horizontal allocation of revenue amongst the states: equality of states, 40 percent; 
population, 30 percent; internal revenue effort, 20 percent; and, social development 
factor, 10 percent.67 The Committee also vested the powers to determine the ve rtical 
allocation formulae on the national assembly. The second part of the Committee’s 
recommendations was later adopted and inculcated in the 1989 Constitution. 68  Although 
some partial democracy took place at the time, it did not last as full military government 
was restored in 1994 under the leadership of General Sani Abacha. The new government 
immediately set up a constitutional conference. Expectedly, the issue of revenue 
allocation was one of the contentious issues. It has, for instance, been asserted that: 
 
In 1994, the mineral producing states at the so called Constitutional 
Conference, convened by the Federal Military Government requested that the 
                                                
 
66 See section 1-6 of the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account) Amendment Decree of 1984.  
 
67 Nyong, 1998, p.42. 
 
68 See Section 160 (3).  
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allocation of revenues derived from their areas be restored to what it was in 
1957, namely, 65 percent thereof. Despite numerous discussions at several 
committee meetings and at plenary sessions, no agreement was reached. 
Eventually, it transpired that the powers that be had agreed to allocate 13 
percent of the revenues derived from mineral producing areas to the affected 
state governments. But this was not to be until the proposed new constitution 
was promulgated in May 1999.69   
 
Despite this constitutional provision, the elected civilian government of Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo refused to implement it. Instead it appointed a Committee to review the 1999 
Constitution. On the issue of revenue allocation, the Committee recommended that the 
derivation formulae be increased substantially beyond the 13 percent minimum 
recommended in the 1999 Constitution. 70 The Government again refused to accept this 
recommendation. Rather, the Government asked the Supreme Court to declare that the 
derivation principle does not apply to offshore oil. The Supreme Court, in its landmark 
judgment in April 2002 agreed with the position of the Federal Government.71 The 
uproar, especially from some of the affected oil producing states, and the imminence of 
the April 2003 general elections however made the Federal Government to cede some 
grounds to the states on the issue. 72 The legitimacy of such concessions however remains 
                                                
 
69 Vincent (2001, p.18). The 1999 Constitution explicitly stated that: ”The President, upon the receipt of 
advice from the National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the 
National Assembly proposals for Revenue Allocation from the Federation Account.  In determining the 
formulae, the National Assembly shall take into account, allocation principles especially those of 
Population, Equality of States, Internal Revenue Generation, Land Mass, Terrain as well as Population 
Density provided that the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as 
being not less than 13 percent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural 
resources, so however, that the figure of the allocation from derivation shall be deemed to include any 
amount that must be set aside for funding any special authority or agency for the development of the State 
or States of derivation” (Section 163 (2) of the 1999 Constitution).       
 
70 1999 Constitution Review Report, p.44. 
 
71 According to the Supreme Court: “the seaward boundary of the littoral State within the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly 
from any natural resources derived from that State… is the low water mark of the land surface thereof or (if 
the case so requires as in the Cross River State with an archipelago of islands) the seaward limits of inland 
waters within the State” (Supreme Court Judgment, 5th April 2002). 
 
72 “THISDAY has exclusively reported last week that the details of the new agreement between President 
Olusegun Obasanjo and the governors of the littoral states over the controversial on shore/ off shore 
dichotomy indicates that the Federal Government may have agreed to grant the states a concession of 200 
meter water depth Isobaths into the high sea. Also, part of the agreement reveals that the 200 meters will 
operate from coast to coast while the major oil companies like shell, Elf, Mobil; and Agip among others 
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in doubt. This is especially so given the fact that the Supreme Court has already 
interpreted the constitutional provisions on the matter. It could therefore be argued that 
only a constitutional amendment can effect a change to the existing position. The revenue 
allocation debate is therefore likely to continue unless a new system is enthroned which 
will change the nation’s focus from revenue sharing to revenue generation. 
 
The Future of Revenue Allocation 
 
The idea and practice of revenue allocation in Nigeria has been dominated by two 
fundamental issues: the proportion of revenue that goes to the federal government vis a 
vis the states and local governments and the basis for sharing the Federation Account 
amongst the states. Although Nigeria is supposed to be operating a federal system of 
Government, in practice it seems to be moving towards a unitary system of government. 
This, in part, stemmed from the historical confusion over the concept of federalism and 
the constant military interventions in our governance system. According to a former 
Chief Justice of Nigeria, Atanda Fatayi Williams: 
 
Unlike most of the older federations, what we did in Nigeria was like 
unscrambling scrambled eggs. We started as a unitary state and then opted for 
a federation afterwards. The problem of Nigeria originally in 1951-52 was 
one of devolution of powers, but when the constitution which was given us 
by Macpherson broke down, we opted for a federal constitution. Very little 
was known by most of us about the theory of federation at the time… It may 
well be that if we knew more about the theory at the time we would have 
emerged in our effort to provide our people with a federal constitution that 
took account of all the peculiar circumstance of our country and our peoples. 
When things began to fall apart, those of us in the know quickly realized that 
ours was the tragedy of assumptions. We assumed everybody, both Federal 
and Regional Governments, the opposition, the electorates, the courts, the 
civil servants, the generality of the people and even the boy academician 
would play the game according to generally accepted rules. Well, because of 
the interplay of political forces, which were beyond their control, they did 
not; the result was the emergency (sic) of military rule. It became clear to us 
                                                                                                                                            
will be allowed to concentrate on what is termed “Ultra Deep Exploration”. A Presidency source has told 
THISDAY that the affected littoral states could only derive revenue from the “coast up to 200 meter depth 
Isobaths into the high sea, while the demarcation into ultra deep exploration will be left for the Federal 
Government for the purposes of calculating the federal revenue” (THISDAY, 17th February 2003).   
 
 33 
all thereafter, that all the time there was no total commitment to the concept 
of federalism. 73     
 
It is this confusion and the impact of the nature of military regimes that has been 
fundamentally responsible for the skewing of the revenue allocation formulae in Nigeria 
in favor of the federal government.74 This, which is the main cause of controversy 
surrounding the vertical allocation of revenue amongst the various tiers of government, 
has had disastrous consequences on the finances and well being of the other tiers of 
Government. Along these lines, it has been argued that: 
 
Over the years, however, there have been consistent attempts by the Federal 
Government to browbeat the States and Local Governments into believing that 
whatever was allocated to them from the federally collected revenue was out of 
the benevolence of the Federal Government.  This has resulted in the 
orchestration of the so-called dependence on State and Local Governments on 
the Federal Govt.  Thus, in sharing the Federation Account with the other levels 
of government, the Federal Government should stop seeing itself as a `Father 
Christmas' and benefactor of the states and local governments.75 
  
Apart from the share of revenue allocated to the federal government via various decrees, 
the military have, in the past, used all sorts of methods to further increase the federal 
governments’ share of the nations resources. Under the Babangida administration, for 
instance, the infamous ‘first charges’ was introduced by the federal government. This 
enabled them to fund some of their responsibilities directly from the Federation Account 
to the detriment of the other tiers of Government. Along these lines, it has been asserted 
that: 
 
A major phenomenon in revenue distribution in Nigeria since 1989 is the 
deduction made for “first charges”. These charges included external debt 
service, dedicated accounts, such as joint venture companies’ (JVC’s), cash 
calls, NNPC priority projects, and excess crude oil earnings. This dictatorial 
practice of “first charges” illustrates quite clearly that the military were not 
interested in Nigeria operating federalism and its corollary, fiscal federalism. 
                                                
73 Quoted in Tamuno, 1998, p.14. 
 
74 Onimode, 1999, p.7.  
 
75 Mbanefo (1997, p. 13)  
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The military believed and operated on the basis that the Federal Military 
Government owned the country, her resources and all that dwelt in the land.76       
   
As the Government increased its share of revenues, so also have its responsibilities. Over 
the years, for instance, the Government has gone into areas arguably better managed by 
the states and local governments. This, has, in most cases, led to unnecessary duplication 
of efforts and wastage of scarce government resources. Such areas include, among others: 
Agriculture, education and healthcare. The result has been colossal fa ilure in several 
instances.77 Excessive government revenues have even led it to participate in areas that 
should have been left to the private sector. These include industries like insurance, 
banking, hotels amongst others. The result has been poor performance and failure, which 
is the main reason behind the current privatization programme of government.78  
 
Furthermore, the unjustified level of funding received by the Federal Government has 
contributed immensely to the high level of corruption in the country. Admittedly, the 
military, in the past, contributed in no small measure in institutionalizing corruption in 
the country. Essentially, the military dissipated and diverted into private pockets, the 
revenue concentrated in the hands of the federal government. The consequence of this has 
been: poor infrastructure, wrecked refineries, crippling education, mass unemployment 
and mass poverty. 79 Although we now have a Civilian government in place, the federal 
government has been most reluctant to allow more funds to be given to the other tiers of 
government. It is therefore no surprise that Nigeria is still known as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world. It is currently ranked as the second most corrupt country in 
                                                
 
76 Vincent (2001, pp. 14-15). Please note that the Supreme Court, in its April 2002 judgment, have now 
nullified the practice of “first charges”.   
 
77  According to Chief Bisi Onabanjo, the second republic Governor of Ogun State: “because of the neglect 
of the Federal Government both in the past and now, we are responsible for taking electricity to our rural 
areas. Our roads, particularly the feeder roads necessary for the evacuation of our farm produce are the 
responsibilities of our State Governments. Food production, with all the goodwill of the Federal 
Government remains particularly the responsibilities of the state governments who are nearer the people. 
The OFN ended up in an Armada of Fertilizers invading our shores; and the present Green Revolution is 
fast turning into an Armada of rice with the Flagship of the Federal Government steaming full ahead” 
(Daily Sketch, 20th February 1981, p.7).  
 
78 Uche, 1999 (pp.221-225)  
 
79 Vincent (2001, p.15).  
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the world. Furthermore, it is estimated that 60 percent of the corruption in the country 
emanates from the Presidency alone.80 
 
The way the federal government locates projects in constituent states has also proved to 
be very unjust, favoring mainly the regions that dominate the center. Take, for instance, 
the case of Rivers State. Although it is a major oil producing State, it has negligible 
federal presence. In its memorandum to the Okigbo Commission, it asserted that: 
 
In the early 1970s, when oil revenue became very dominant, constituting 
about 90 percent of the Federal Financial resources, a dangerous system of 
as-hoc federal grants to the States was introduced. From revenues, the 
Federal Government retained for itself, which at the time was constituting 
about 70-80 percent of all total revenues, in the country, it introduced a 
system of non statutory specific grants outside the regular revenue allocation 
scheme in order to increase the flow of Federal Finances to the States in such 
areas as Agriculture, Health, Road transportation, Education, Water Supply, 
Sewerage and Drainage and River Basin Developments. Undoubtedly, there 
were several lopsided unfair allocations to some favored States of the 
Federation. Rivers State in particular did not receive fair allocation from the 
ad-hoc grant even though it was contributing immensely to the Federal 
Revenue. A summary of roads, proposed to be carried out by the Federal 
Government, in the 1970-75 Plan Period shows that out of 10,058.8 miles of 
roads, only 338 miles were proposed for Rivers State. [T]his again is the 
smallest mileage in the whole Federation. 81   
 
Such feeling of marginalization is widespread in the entire Southern Nigeria. Most States 
here believe that the Federal Government has deliberately favored the Northern States at 
the expense of their Southern counterparts. 82 This issue has been further complicated by 
                                                
 
80 “As a big businessman a few years ago, the current Defence Minister Theophilus Danjuma, submitted 
that “When the fish is rotten it starts from the head,” It is therefore instructive that within the last four 
years, Nigeria has sunk to the lowest level of the most corrupt country in the world according to 
Transparency International. Furthermore, both British and American intelligence report concluded that 
sixty percent of corruption in Nigeria is within the Presidency at Abuja” (Daily Champion, April 17, 2003, 
p.32). 
 
81 See Okigbo Commission Report, 1980, Volume 3, p.376. 
 
82 In a recent joint proposal submitted by the 11 states of the South-South and South-East, to the Chairman, 
Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Co mmission, it was asserted that: “The Federal Government 
has so far spent about N42.1 billion to build dams in six arid states in the North while neglecting the 
massive gully erosion menace and severe environmental degradation of the States of the South-East and 
South-South…. [Furthermore] the PTF [Petroleum Trust Fund] intervened massively in the rehabilitation of 
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the accordance, by most States, including Southern States, of superior rights to its 
indigenes. Admittedly, this policy, which had its origins in Northern Nigeria, in the 
1950s, commenced at the time when derivation was the main basis of revenue allocation 
and before the rise in prominence of oil as a main source of revenue. The Northernization 
policy was simply aimed at developing Northern manpower which would take over the 
Southern dominated Northern Civil Service. Between 1954 and 1958, for instance, a total 
of 2148 Southerners lost their jobs in the Northern Public Service in the spirit of the 
Northernization policy.83 
 
The Northernization policy hardly occasioned any protests at the time. This was 
particularly so given the fact that at the time, most of the resources of the Regions were 
derived from the regions. They therefore had the moral right to determine how to spend 
it. Things has however since changed. Most states are now dependent on the Federation 
Account, which is sustained mainly by oil revenue from the oil producing states in the 
South. Despite this, discriminatory policies that give preference to indigenes is still 
widespread. Southerners living in the North scarcely have the same rights as their 
Northern counterparts. For example, an indigene of Rivers State, a southern oil producing 
state, that resides in Kano State, a non-oil producing northern state, will have limited 
employment rights in the Kano State Civil Service. This is so despite the fact that oil 
from his state contributes immensely to the funding of Kano State. Such practice, which 
turns the entire concept of national unity on its head, is clearly objectionable.   
 
Like the vertical allocation of revenue among the various tiers of government, the 
horizontal allocation of revenue amongst the constituent states of the federation is also 
mired in controversy. This has been so especially since the country formally became a 
federation in 1954. This controversy has however also intensified since the discovery of 
oil in the late 1950s.84 The concept of derivation as the major basis for revenue allocation 
                                                                                                                                            
social infrastructures in many non-oil producing States but there was little or no presence of the PTF in the 
States of the South-East and South-South” (2001, p.19).     
 
83 Albert, 1998, p.57. 
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has since lost its prominence to other basis such as land mass, population, equality of 
states, revenue generation effort, among others. Derivation was, for instance, roundly 
condemned by the Dina Commission Report, which argued that the adoption of this 
concept by previous revenue allocation committees was inimical to national 
development: 
 
In the history of Nigeria’s revenue allocation, it is probably true to say that no 
principle has evoked more rivalry and bitterness than that of derivation…. 
[P]revious Revenue Allocation Commissions did little more than to test the 
political wind of their period and bow to it in designing their formula. In the 
context in which they worked, this was perhaps inevitable. But the derivation 
principle had been in the forefront of the allocation formulae all along; and 
the political wind has been set by the changing position of regional pressure 
groups according to the fortunes of their fiscal base. In the short run, the 
result was the exasperation of inter-regional conflicts. In the long run, the 
consequence is the lost opportunity to develop a cohesive fiscal system for 
national, political, economic and social development. 85 
 
Even the current Civilian President has cast aspersions on the demands by oil producing 
states for more emphasis to be given for the derivation principle. According to a recent 
newspaper report: 
 
President Olusegun Obasanjo has described the fight for resource control by 
governors of states in the South-South zone as a war against God Almighty. 
According to the President… that natural resources were carefully located in 
the Niger Delta region by God is not an accident,..  “it is the design of God. 
And any one fighting against that is fighting against God… Let the resources 
be for everybody. If we don’t put ourselves together to work together, we 
                                                                                                                                            
84 “The principle of derivation has dominated revenue sharing in this country since [the 1940s]….  when we 
began moving from a unitary to a federal system of Government. Thus the Phillipson Commission of 1946 , 
applied, effectively, only the principle of derivation. Hicks -Phillipson (1951) proposed derivation as one of 
three principles while Chick (1953), adopted derivation only; but, for the first time, extended it to cover 
100 percent of mining rents and royalties to the Region of origin. Mining rents and royalties since have 
remained with us in varying degrees, as a derivation principle of revenue allocation… This principle, be it 
in the glorious days of cocoa in the West and groundnut pyramids in the North or the oil boom seventies in 
the Rivers and Bendel States, has always aroused envy not because it is illogical or unjust to give more to 
him that contributes more: but simply and solely because it gives more money to these states. The situation 
has been aggravated by the sudden dominance of the economy by the oil sector, resulting in much larger 
sums of money accruing from rents and royalties, being shared essentially between two minority states. 
After reducing the factors from 100 percent to a mere 20 percent (Decree Number 6. of 1975), and the 
residue was still sizable, we had to look for reasons why it should not exist at all” (Letton and Phillips, 
1980, p.7).      
 
85 Dina Commission Report, 1969, p.63. 
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cannot fight poverty. In unity we can fight poverty… [W]e should do nothing 
to cause another civil war in this country… If Biafra had won the Nigeria 
Biafra civil war, I would not have been alive by now. Those of us who fought 
the civil war should have this in mind”. If the Biafrans had won the Nigerian 
civil war, the Niger Delta States of Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, 
Delta and Edo would not have existed, adding that the resources found in the 
Niger Delta region were a divine provisions that belong to all Nigerians. 
President Obasanjo reiterated that many Nigerian from the Northern and 
Western parts who lost their lives during the Nigerian civil war made 
sacrifice because of resources in the area.86      
 
Although such assertions may have their merits, the fact remains that no real economic 
growth has taken place in the country since Government started de-emphasizing 
derivation. Essentially, the huge revenues that have emanated from oil over the last three 
decades or so have made it unattractive for non-oil producing states to develop their other 
revenue earning potentials. Rather, they have tended to focus all their efforts on agitating 
for revenues from the so-called ‘national cake.’87 In other words the attention of the 
entire country is now focused on revenue sharing rather than revenue generation. It is this 
struggle for revenue sharing that has led to all sorts of economic illogicalities like the 
creation of unviable states and local governments. 
In fact, some of the so-called new states and local government areas are simply not viable 
and almost wholly depend on the federatio n account for their existence. Under such 
circumstances, the additional bureaucratic costs of such establishments far outweigh their 
benefits. According to a former Nigerian President:  
                                                
 
86 Saturday Tribune, 17 th March 2001, pp.1 and 5. 
 
87 “The nature of oil wealth spawned a political culture in which emphasis was on how to share the 
providential wealth, rather than how to engage in the production of renewable and viable alternatives. As 
such, other sources of revenue were neglected in the rush for oil resources at the center, thus giving the 
federal government a lot of leverage, which unfortunately was channeled into unproductive pursuits. 
Although oil fed into the rapid expansion of the economy and the import dependent private sector, the 
economy did not undergo any real structural development. A lot of energy was dissipated on the 
destabilizing struggle for federal power, while the economy remained dependent on a single commodity 
whose fortunes were externally determined. Under oil, fiscal federalism in Nigeria and the revenue 
allocation system has gone through several convulsions which culminated in the tightening of the grip of 
federal power over the entire process, with the concomitant increase in the struggle for access to, and 
control over federal power” (Obi, 1998, p.265).  
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It is hard to see what contribution the creation of yet more states will make to 
our recovery and progress… Civil servants will earn rapid promotion and 
businessmen and women a fresh wave of contracts for more prestigious 
buildings and projects. This will be it… No new resources are likely to be 
generated either from taxes, production or services. Dependent on federal 
handouts and ill equipped to perform their functions, the new states will 
simply be a drain on already limited resources… This is not development. It 
is absurdity.88 
It has further been pointed out that only few states can provide up to 30 percent of their 
planned expenditures from their internally generated revenues. Between 1990 and 1994, 
for instance, 70 percent of the recurrent revenues of the state governments was derived 
from the Federation Account. Internally generated revenues accounted for only 17.8 
percent while the balance of 12.2 percent was received from the federal government as 
special discretionary grants.89  
 
The current revenue allocation formulae, which de-emphasizes derivation, has also led to 
outright injustice in the sharing of the so-called ‘national cake.’ The oil producing states 
have also been protesting against such discriminations for some time now. Take for 
instance the circumstances of the Niger Delta Community, which remains till date the 
main source of Nigerian oil. The high level of oil production in the area has had immense 
negative consequences on both the economy and environment of the territory. It has, for 
instance, been rightly pointed out that: 
 
The high activity level in the Niger Delta has exposed the area to the dangers 
of water, land and air pollution as well as oil fields which have endangered 
aquatic life as well as the entire ecosystem, topography and surface 
vegetation. For instance, in 1979, a storage facility at the West Niger Delta  
Shell operated Forcados terminal collapsed. This spilled an estimated 
                                                
88 Quoted in Suberu (1998, p.286). It has also been argued that: “One implication of this 
continuous growth in the number of states and local governments is that the statutory allocations of 
each tier of government have dwindled and became inadequate for supporting their total 
expenditure.  The creation of new states and local governments tend to induce high overhead costs  
such as increased provision of secretariats, staff emolument, rental of buildings, etc, with the  
consequence that outlays on maintenance and new capital expenditures are low” (CBN, Annual 
Report, 1997, p.79). 
  
 
89 Sunday Punch, 18th August 1986, p.23.  
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560,000 barrels into the surrounding land, mangrove swamps and the 
Atlantic. There was hardly any respite. In January 1980, another major 
blowout occurred which spewed out some 200,000 barrels of crude oil into 
the Atlantic and destroyed some 840 acres of Niger Delta mangrove. A more 
recent spillage took place in January 1998, in which a 24 inch oil pipeline 
linking the Idoho offshore platform with the Mobil operated Qua Iboe 
Terminal ruptured. An estimated 40,000 barrels of crude spilled into the 
Atlantic polluting the coastline from Eket to Lagos… The Jesse fire incidence 
of October 1998, is still very fresh in the minds of many Nigerians where 
over 1500 lives were lost and several hectares of farmland and plantations 
were razed by fire.90     
 
It is therefore not surprising that such injustices have led to unending strife in the oil 
producing areas further dampening the prospects for economic development and 
growth. 91 In other words, even the production of the oil itself is now being threatened. 
For any meaningful development to take place, therefore, there is need to rethink the 
entire revenue allocation formulae in the country.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Prior to the discovery of oil in Nigeria, other sectors of the economy thrived. Agriculture, 
for instance, was a major source of revenue for the Western Region. The Eastern Region 
that was less endowed devised other sources of revenue. All this has however changed since 
the discovery of oil in the country. This has led to the demise of the other productive sectors 
                                                
90 Okoh and Egbon (1999, p.411-412). In its memorandum to the Okigbo Commission of 1980, one of the 
oil producing states (Bendel) also argued that: ”The Government of this State spends a considerable 
proportion of its funds in combating some of the adverse side effects arising from the oil industry. … the 
oil industry has disrupted the traditional occupations of the people of the Niger-delta namely, fishing, 
farming, salt making, weaving of mats and distillery. Peasant farmers displaced by the oil industry migrate 
in large numbers to the Urban centers like Warri, Sapele and Ughelli and thus accentuate the demand for 
the provision of more health, housing, water, sewerage and drainage facilities in these towns. Warri, for 
example, which is supposed to be booming with oil wealth paradoxically also presents some of the worst 
spectacles of squalor, slum and poor drainage in the Country as a whole. On account of the adverse 
inaccessibility of the oil producing Niger delta areas, the State Government is now obliged to offer 
inducement of 50 to 80 percent of the contract price to enable contractors accept contract awards in respect 
of projects sited in the area….  It could be seen therefore that the peculiar topography of the oil producing 
areas and the adverse effects of the oil industry impose additional strains on the financial resources of the 
State Government. The Bendel State Government, therefore, needs a more significant share of the mining 
rents and royalties derived from the State to enable it solve these problems” (reproduced in Okigbo 
Commission Report, Volume 3, p.117).    
 
91 Obi (1998, p.269). 
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of the economy. In fact, Nigerians are poorer today than they were in the pre-oil boom 
days.92 This is mainly because of the methodology of sharing the oil revenue. The struggle 
for the control of the oil wealth has led to an unfortunate shift from a revenue-oriented 
principle to an expenditure-oriented principle of revenue allocation.  According to a former 
Governor of one of the oil producing states: 
 
Derivation is the only revenue oriented principle of revenue allocation, unlike 
other principles (such as population and equality of state), which are 
expenditure oriented. As a revenue oriented criterion, it serves as a major factor 
for the promotion of the most desired “national interest” of the country. It 
creates satisfaction for the producer of the revenue by compensating him for his 
efforts, sufferings, deprivations and ecological damages associated with the 
generation of the revenue such as in the oil industry.93      
 
There is thus need to revert back to a revenue generation oriented principle of revenue 
allocation. Admittedly, derivation if applied today will severely disadvantage most of the 
non-oil producing states. Although this is true, this will only be in the short run.  This is so 
since most of them will have no choice but to develop other sources of income. We must not 
forget that the country is well endowed with other productive assets and resources. As 
already mentioned, prior to the discovery of oil, agriculture was the main stay of the 
economy. The struggle for control of the oil revenue has been the main reason for the 
decimation of the agricultural sector of the Nigerian economy. A policy shift, which places 
more emphasis on derivation, will therefore force the non-oil states to refocus on the areas 
of their comparative advantage like agriculture. Admittedly, this will not be easy as the 
revenue and tax laws have since been over-centralized all in the bid to justify the prominent 
role of the Federal Government in the Nigerian polity. There is thus the need to give more 
powers for revenue creation and control back to the states. Such states will therefore be in a 
position to take into consideration their peculiar circumstances before determining their tax 
and revenue laws.  
 
 
                                                
 
92 Herbst (1996, p.159).  
 
93 Quoted in Daily Times, July 19, 1980, p.3. 
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